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Abstract:  
Minority shareholders in China face the risk of exploitation by both managers and majority 
shareholders. This is due to owner absence and concentrated ownership structures. In reducing 
these double agency costs, non-legal protection has a key role to play. Four market forces have 
been identified as reducing these double agency costs: each of these will be evaluated. Whilst 
their effectiveness may be recognised in some countries, this paper will conclude that certain 
factors hamper their function, thus rendering them ineffective in today’s Chinese context. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
China has been experiencing unprecedented economic and social development due to its 
economic reform and open policy. This significant economic achievement of the recent past 
also creates a number of difficulties that must be addressed. Prevalent reports of exploitation by 
majority shareholders and managers have enhanced the view that agency cost in Chinese 
companies is exceptionally severe. Thus the capital market and economic development would 
be negatively affected if this agency cost was not properly addressed.1 With this increasing 
awareness of providing protections for minority shareholders in China, many mechanisms have 
been adopted and enacted to reduce the agency costs.  
In addressing this issue, the law can have a significant role to play. The apparent example is 
Company Law 2005 which was first enacted in 1992 and then revised in 2005.2 This amended 
legislation is regarded as an investors-friendly law as it introduced many institutions to protect 
the interests of minority shareholders. 3For example, the derivative action which aims to 
protect the interests of the company and the minority shareholders was introduced at the very 
first time.4 Indeed, the legal protections, which focus on how law and regulations organise the 
internal structure of the company and coordinate the relationship among the constituencies, are 
necessary to provide protections for minority shareholders. However, this article attempts not to 
explore the legal methods, but to evaluate the non-legal protections as there have been a vast 
number of literatures examining the legal mechanisms in reducing agency costs and protecting 
minority shareholders. Non-legal protections, mainly market forces, could also have a key role 
to play in constraining the misbehaviours of directors or majority shareholders. As such, it is 
meaningful to explore these non-legal methods in the context of China.  
As the non-legal methods mentioned here aim to reduce the agency costs and thus protect the 
interests of minority shareholders, this article thus will first briefly explore the double agency 
costs in China: vertical agency cost between shareholders and managers and horizontal agency 
cost between majority shareholders and minority shareholders. In addressing these issues, this 
article will proceed to evaluate the non-legal protections for minority shareholders in the 
context of Chinese contemporary society. Four types of market forces have been identified in 
this regards: the product market, the labour market for managers, the capital market and the 
market for corporate control. Although these market forces may be effective in other 
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 The details of agency costs in China, please see: Shaowei Lin, “Double Agency Costs in China: A Legal 
Perspective”, Asian Business Lawyer, 2012 Vol.9, pp115-135. 
2
 The Company Law of the People's Republic of China was amended at the 18th session of the Standing 
Committee of the Tenth National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China on October 27, 2005. It then 
entered into force on January 1, 2006. 
3
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4
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jurisdictions, this article will conclude that their effectiveness in reducing the agency costs in 
the context of China is strongly doubted. 
2. DOUBLE AGENCY COSTS 
The theory of agency cost was first unveiled by Berle and Means in which they identified that 
those who control large public companies do not necessarily have substantial ownership 
interest in them, while conversely, those who own such corporations do not manage them.5 
Whilst the separation of ownership from management can ultimately increase company benefits 
and promote the capital market, this separation can also create conflicts when the interests of 
managers and shareholders are not aligned. 6  Thus, agency costs may arise due to this 
separation. Three agency problems have been identified in business firms: vertical agency 
problems between shareholders and managers, horizontal agency problems between majority 
shareholders and minority shareholders, and third agency problems between a firm itself and 
the other parties with whom that firm contracts.7 As the latter agency problem is not relevant to 
the protections of minority shareholders, it will thus not be discussed in this article. 
Concerning the first two agency problems, various studies have identified a relationship 
between ownership structure and agency cost.8 In jurisdictions where ownership structure is 
dispersed, such as the UK and the USA, managerial agency cost is generally much more serious. 
That is because mangers have much greater power to control a company because scattered 
shareholders mean that no block shareholders are able to monitor management.9 Conversely, 
for those jurisdictions with concentrated ownership, such as Germany, the managerial agency 
problem is not a major issue; rather, conflicts between controlling shareholders and 
non-controlling shareholders are of principle concern.10 In these ownership- concentrated 
countries, majority shareholders have both the ability and incentive to constrain the directors’ 
                                                             
5
 AA Berle and GC Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (rev ed Harcourt 1968); See also P 
Redmond (9ed) Companies and Securities Law: Commentary and Materials (Law book Co 1988) p181. 
6
 See, e.g., Steven Ross, “the Economics Theory of Agency: The Principal’s Problem”, 63 American Economic 
Review 134 (1973). 
7
 Reinier Kraakman et, The Anatomy of Corporate Law, ((2
nd
 edition, Oxford, OUP, 2009) ,P36. 
8
 See Berglöf, E. (1997). “A note on the typology of financial systems”. In K. Hopt and E. Wymeersch (eds), 
Comparative Corporate Governance: Essays and Materials (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter), 151–64; Armour, J., 
Deakin, S. and Konzelmann, S. “Shareholder Primacy and the Trajectory of UK Corporate Governance”, (2003) 
41 British Journal of Industrial Relations, 531, 533;  
9
 See R. La Porta, F. Lopez-De-Silanes A. Shleifer & R. Vishny, “Corporate Ownership around the World”(1999) 
54 Journal of Finance, 475;  M. Aoki, “Controlling Insider Control: Issues of Corporate Governance in 
Transition Economies” In Masabiko Aoki & Hyung-Ki Kim (eds.), Corporate Governance in Transition economy, 
Insider Control and the Role of Bank (EDI Development Studies 1996) ,5, 
10
 See Cheffins, B. “Putting Britain on the Roe map: the emergence of the Berle–Means corporation in the United 
Kingdom”, In J. McCahery and L. Renneboog (eds), Convergence and Diversity in Corporate Governance 
Regimes and Capital Markets,( Oxford: Oxford University Press), 147–70; The discussion in J. Armour, R. 
Kraakman, P. Davies, L. Enriques, H. Hansmann, G. Hertig, K. Hopt, H. Kanda & E. Rock, The Anatomy of 
Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach (2
nd
 edition, Oxford, OUP, 2009) 29-32 
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performance. At the same time, agency problems between majority and minority shareholders 
are created as the former can impose their influence on the company to benefit themselves at 
the expense of the latter. Although these two types of agency problems can coexist, they are 
usually mutually exclusive as countries generally have dispersed ownership or concentrated 
ownership structures. However, this is not the case in China.  
2.1 Vertical Agency Cost between Shareholders and Managers 
As mentioned above, the agency problem between managers and shareholders is not a 
dominant issue where ownership structure is very concentrated, as block shareholders are better 
able to influence management. This might appear to be the position in China as many listed 
companies are still controlled by the government. Indeed, according to research conducted by 
the Chinese State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), by the 
end of 2009 almost 900 listed companies were controlled by the government, of 1600 
companies on the Chinese stock exchange. Further, these state-own enterprises occupied over 
80 percent of the total share values of all listed corporations.11 It may therefore seem that the 
managerial agency problem should not be a key concern in China as ownership is so 
concentrated that managers could not have sufficient power and discretion to gain personally at 
the expense of the company or other shareholders. Unfortunately, however, these suppositions 
are not applicable to China due to the State-owned enterprise (SOE) reform. The SOE reform 
which aimed to establish a modern enterprise system has increased managerial autonomy. 
Without an effective external checks and balances, this reform also results in many negative 
consequences in which the problem of owner absence is the most severe one.12 Accompanying 
with this owner absence, the State as a majority shareholder cannot exercise its legal rights and 
powers to constrain the misbehaviours of management. As a consequence, the interests of 
minority shareholders are vulnerable to be exploited by the managers and thus a vertical agency 
problem may arise. 
2.2 Horizontal Agency Cost between Majority Shareholders and Minority 
Shareholders 
It is widely accepted that this kind of agency cost is very common in concentrated ownership 
jurisdictions. This is particularly so in China as SOEs are widespread. However, it is also 
argued that because the state, rather than other investors, is the sole controlling shareholder in 
listed SOEs, it is unlikely that the government will act against the interests of minority 
shareholders. Generally, it is true that the government has a legitimate concern to protect the 
interests of the company as a whole, including those of minority shareholders. However, this 
might not always be the case as government interests may not always align with the interests of 
                                                             
11
 'Guo Zi Wei Dui Shangshi Gongsi Zuo de Buchong Guiding' [A Survey on Listed Companies by State-Owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council] at 
<http://www.chinasoe.com.cn/gqxgc/2009-11-27/404535.shtml>  accessed 21
st
 September 2011. 
12
 Details of the SOE reform in China, please see: Shaowei Lin, “Double Agency Costs in China: A Legal 
Perspective”, Asian Business Lawyer, 2012(1). 
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minority shareholders or even the company itself.13 Therefore, agency cost arises when the 
state, as a controlling shareholder, attempts to maximise its own benefits to the detriment of the 
interests of minority shareholders. 
Three major forms of tunnelling activity engaged in by controlling shareholders have been 
identified in China.14 The first is where listed companies are forced to provide soft loans or 
guarantees to controlling shareholders.15 The second is where the assets of listed companies are 
transferred at an undervalued or unfair price to a third party who is involved with a controlling 
shareholder.16 The last is where the assets of listed companies are appropriated or misused 
directly by the controlling shareholders.17 Although new ways of tunnelling have been found,18 
the above three activities remain the main popular methods. In light of the deteriorating 
situation, many measures have been adopted to tackle these problems though they have 
generally proved futile in the face of the expanding scale of tunnelling. Practical research 
conducted by Li has found out that RMB 96.7 billion was appropriated by controlling 
shareholders in 2002,19 with this figure doubling in 2003.20 Another study has also revealed 
that 37 percent of the 173 listed companies had experienced the tunnelling phenomenon.21 
                                                             
13
 Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, “A Survey of Corporate Governance”, 52 Journal of Finance (1997) 737, 
758-61. 
14
 The term of “tunnelling” was originally used to describe the expropriation of minority shareholders in the 
Czech Republic and then it was expanded to characterize the transfer of assets or resources of a company to its 
majority shareholders. See Simon Johnson et al., “Tunnelling”. 90 American Economic Review, (2000) 22. 
15
 See Shanghai Zhengquan Jiaoyi Suo [Shanghai Stock Exchange],'Guanyu Dui Shanghai Lengguang Shiye 
Gufen Youxian Gongsi Gongkai Qianze de Gonggao [Notice on Public Criticism on Shanghai Lengguang Shiye 
plc] (11th 6 1999); available at <http://static.sse.com.cn/sseportal/ps/zhs/> accessed 4th October 2011 Shenzhen 
Zhengquan Jiaoyi Suo [Shenzhen Stock Exchange], 'Guanyu dui Beijing Zhongguancun Keji Fazhan (Konggu) 
Gufen Youxian Gongsi Yuyi Gongkai Qianze de Gonggao' [Notice on Public Criticism on Beijing Zhongguancun 
Keji Fazhan plc] (28th 9 2001) available at: <http://www.szse.cn/>  accessed 4th October 2011 also see G.H. 
Jiang, C.M. Lee & H. Yue, “Tunneling in China: The Surprisingly Pervasive Use of Corporate Loan to Extract 
Funds from Chinese Listed Companies”, Johnson School Research Paper Series 31-06. 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=861445>  accessed 4th October 2011 
16
 See Shanghai Zhengquan Jiaoyi Suo, [ Shanghai Stock Exchange] 'Guanyu Dui Hubei Xingfu Shiye Gufen 
Youxian Gongsi Gongkai Qianze de Gonggao' [Notice on Public Criticism on Hubei Xingfu Shiye plc] (23rd 2 
2001) available at <http://static.sse.com.cn/sseportal/ps/zhs/> accessed 4th October 2011. 
17
 Zhongguo Zhengjianhui [CSRC] 'Guanyu dui Hubei Meierya Gufen Youxian Gongsi Ji Yougian Renyuan Yuyi 
Gongkai Piping de Gonggao' [Notice on Public Criticism on Hubei Meierya Gufen Youxian plc] (12th 9 2001) 
available at <http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub> accessed 4th October 2011 Zhongguo Zhengjianhui [CSRC] 'Guanyu 
dui Ningxia He Minzu Huagong Gufen Youxian Gongsi Ji Yougian Renyuan Yuyi Gongkai Piping de Gonggao' 
[Notice on Public Criticism on Ningxia He Minzu Huagong plc] (31st 10 2001) <http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub> 
accessed 4th October 2011 
18
 See Sheng Min, “New Ways of Tunnelling Listed Companies”, New Fortune, November 5, 2006. 
19
 Li Shan, “Appropriation of One Hundred Billion by the Controlling Shareholder Alarms the Bell”, Shanghai 
Securities News, April 2, 2004. 
20
 Yongjun Zhang, “Appropriation of the Listed Companies’ Assets by the Controlling Shareholders Should be 
Addressed Fundamentally”, Securities Times, December 7, 2004. 
21
 H. Zhang, Z.D. Wu, “The Characteristics of Appropriation of Public Companies' assets in China”, (2003) 5 
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3. NON-LEGAL PROTECTION FOR MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS 
In order to protect the interests of minority shareholders and companies, market forces are in 
place to reduce these double agency costs. Four market forces have been identified to constrain 
the opportunistic behaviour of managers and majority shareholders: namely, the product market, 
the labour market for managers, the capital market and the market for corporate control. 
3.1 The Product Market 
The principle market for a company is that in which it sells its products. To compete in today’s 
fiercely competitive market, it is extremely important for companies to provide high quality 
products. To achieve that goal, a company must impose rigid controls on all aspects of 
productions and sale to reduce redundant costs. If a company’s product cannot be competitively 
priced, then it can lose its market share and induce the negative consequence that managers are 
likely to be dismissed. In this respect, there is little room for managers to abuse their powers to 
pursue personal interests by exploiting the company. For example, self-dealing directors would 
have greater concern in keeping the company’s product competitive. Legal remedies are 
thereby less important as directors have restricted space to manipulate their positions. 
In China, the economic miracle has undoubtedly demonstrated the success of the market 
economy. The transformation from a planned economy to a market-oriented economy has seen 
markets becoming increasingly competitive. This is also enhanced by rapid globalization. It is 
therefore reasonable to suggest that in practice product markets in China have prevented 
directors from misusing their powers to some extent and in this sense the interests of minority 
shareholders might be safeguarded. This assertion is supported by some practical research. 
Huang has examined the relationship between product market and corporate governance among 
807 listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange. He concluded that a 
competitive product market can improve resource allocation and enhance supervision within 
the company, which together constrain the behaviour of directors, and thus improving corporate 
governance.22 
Another practical study led by Xiao and Xia was to investigate the relationship between the 
product market and Board of Directors using evidence from listed manufacturing corporations 
in China from 2003 to 2005. This study found that product market competition can effectively 
increase the efficiency of the company and improve the functions of the corporate 
governance.23 This is further sustained by Qi and Yan.24 Nevertheless, the above studies 
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 Lei Huang, “The Practical Analysis of Product Market Competition”, Journal of Finance and Economy, 
2010.11.pp72-74. 
23
 Xiao Hao, Xia Xin-ping, “Product Market Competition, Board of Director and Stock Price Synchronicity- An 
Empirical Study Based on China’s Listed Manufacturing Companies”, Journal of Guizhou College of Finance, 
2011.(1). P62-67. 
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neglect to address the political factors behind the listed companies under examination. As a 
Communist country, the Chinese government must own or control some listed companies and 
these state-owned enterprises or state-controlled corporations might differ in their effectiveness 
vis-à-vis the product market. Research conducted by Fisman and Faccin shows that 
state-controlled corporations can significantly increase their value because of special political 
connections25 while this is not the case in China. SOEs in China have to fulfil a number of 
functions assumed by the government, such providing employment, taxation and social stability 
to build a harmonious society. This policy burden not only hampers the corporation’s value, but 
also affects the efficiency of investment.26 In return, SOEs receive financial subsidy from the 
government when their products are not competitive. Here, the product market seems to be less 
important for some SOEs. Empirical research on China also supports the assertion that 
government-controlled enterprises are less sensitive to product market competition.27 Even in 
some private sectors, local companies do not need to worry about their products because of the 
local protections. The obvious example is the beer industry where any local authorities wish to 
protect their own beer companies and thus restrict the beer products of other areas. 
3.2 The Labour Market for Managers 
Reference to the “labour market for managers” denotes the employment market place for 
managerial and director services. Mangers and directors, like other employees, must look for 
work when they are unemployed. Disloyalty or actions harmful to a previous employer, 
damages their reputation and reduces their ability to obtain a well-paid job.28 In this regard, the 
labour market for managers could act as a mechanism to constrain agency cost and protect the 
interests of the minority shareholders. 
Theoretically it does indeed provide a strong disincentive to incompetence or disloyalty where 
managers wish to pursue their careers. However, this function might be undermined by real 
world factors. First, where managers are at the end of their careers, the market for managerial 
and director services may not operate well to constrain misbehaviour, as senior officers no 
longer seek to further their careers and their performance may not to some extent matter to 
them. This is particularly so in China where many senior SOE officers exploit their personal 
interests through self-dealings or embezzlement when they are close to retirement. This so 
called “59 phenomenon” is not uncommon in China because retirement pensions for SEO 
officers are considerably lower than for government officials operating at the same level. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Financial, 2011(1) p41-45. In which it is argued that the debt ratio and product market competition intensity have 
notably negative effects on each other. 
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 Fisman R, “ Estimating the Value of Political Connections”, The American Economic Review, 2001. 91(4): 
1095-1102. 
26
 Qingsheng Zeng and Xinyuan Chen, “The State-Controlled Shares, Excess Employees and the Cost of Labour”, 
Journal of Economic Study, 2006(5), 74-86. 
27
 Yimin Xu and Zhihong Zhang, “Product Market Competition, Government Control and Investment Efficiency”, 
SoftScience, 2010(12). Pp19-23. 
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Secondly, where managers have sufficient personal wealth, the labour market might not be an 
effective method of curbing misbehaviour. Thirdly, even if managers are sacked for disloyalty 
or incompetence, the market place may not be informed of this as the company may be 
concerned about damaging its reputation in disclosing this information: thus those managers 
may continue to serve in other companies as prestigious as in the previous. Furthermore, in the 
context of China’s Party State, senior SOE managers are unlikely to lose their jobs merely 
because they are not competent or loyal to their companies. Many SOEs are controlled by the 
so-called Taizidang or offspring of party leaders.29 Their removal is highly unlikely unless they 
commit some serious crime that might put the whole company at risk. This can be illustrated by 
the case of Chen Jiulin, a former head of China Aviation Oil (Singapore) Corp, sentenced to the 
prison for more than four years for his role in a scandal that drove the company to the brink of 
bankruptcy. His poor governance led to a significant loss and failure to disclose a $550 million 
trading loss. He was also charged with deceiving adviser, Deutsche Bank AG. That sentence 
seemed to mark the end of his career as Chen was no longer eligible to work in SOEs under 
China’s Company Law and Enterprise State-owned Assets Law. 30  However, Chen was 
nevertheless appointed to be the vice president of CGGC International Ltd (zhongguo 
Gezhouba Jituan Guoji Youxiangongsi) after his released from prison. 31  It is therefore 
conceivable that such a person could be reappointed as vice president of an SOE after causing a 
                                                             
29
 See Zheng Yongnian and Lye Liang Fook, “Elite Politics and the fourth generation of Chinese Leadership”, 
Journal of Chinese Political Science, Volume8, numbers 1-2. Pp65-86. 
30
 Article147 of Company Law 2005 states that “A person in any of the following categories may not serve as a 
director, supervisor, or the general manager of a company:  
(1) without civil capacity or with limited civil capacity;  
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Article 73 of Enterprise State-owned Assets Law states: “ Where any director, supervisor or senior manager of a 
wholly state-owned enterprise, wholly state-owned company or company in which the state has a controlling stake 
is removed from office for a violation of this Law which has caused gross losses of state-owned assets, he shall not 
serve as a director, supervisor or senior manager of any wholly state-owned enterprise, wholly state-owned 
company or company in which the state has a controlling stake within 5 years from the day of removal; if the 
violation has caused especially gross losses of state-owned assets or he has been subject to a criminal punishment 
for corruption, bribery, encroachment upon property, embezzlement of property or undermining of the socialist 
market economic order, he shall not serve as a director, supervisor or senior manager of any wholly state-owned 
enterprise, wholly state-owned company or company in which the state has a controlling stake for life.” 
31
 Although it is argued that his appointment is not against the law because the crime he committed was in 
Singapore and the penalty execution does not necessarily extend to the mainland of China, it is quite quibble for 
this argument as what Chen Jiulin had done was obviously proved to be an inappropriate person to run the 
state-owned enterprises. See <http://baike.baidu.com/view/134742.htm> accessed 21
st
 September 2011. 
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loss of state assets; the function of labour market for managers is consequently highly 
questionable in this Party-State.  
3.3 The Capital Market 
Another non-legal protection for minority shareholders is the capital market. This mechanism 
operates on the principle that high agency cost will lower company’s share price as 
shareholders will exercise their exit rights by selling their shares. Lower share price has the 
following minimum consequences: first, it makes it difficult for a company to raise finance on 
the capital market. Secondly, it can be easily acquired by other companies. In order to avoid 
this, directors and managers must reduce agency costs, thus disincentivising their exploitation 
of minority shareholder interests. Nonetheless, the key question is how the capital market 
reflects share price. 
The rationale behind this assertion is the ‘semi-strong efficiency’ hypothesis, known as the 
‘efficient capital markets hypothesis’.32 This theory holds that capital markets are efficient and 
can incorporate all publicly available information into the price of a company’s shares. It does 
not presume that everyone is aware of the information available to the public and makes their 
decisions according to a proper analysis of this information as it is obviously impossible for 
every investor to investigate relevant information before buying or selling shares. Instead, it 
assumes that there are some market participants who are strong and smart enough to alter share 
prices in the right direction.33 Such participants might be the highly informed and skilled 
investors investing their own or other people’s money, or those investors who themselves are 
not very informed but rely on market professionals such as research analysts or securities.  
In theory, it may be correct that publicly available information could inform capital markets 
which are efficient enough to reflect this information in share prices. However, the extent to 
which this hypothesis is merely an attractive theoretical idea or empirical reality has been a 
subject of intense debate. It would take a whole book to discuss this issue which therefore is 
beyond the scope of this paper. However, recent events in capital markets indicated that this 
hypothesis has increasingly less support. For example, the technology bubble in the late 
nineties and the recent subprime mortgage crisis appear to indicate that the market was pricing 
available information inaccurately. The counter-argument is that this hypothesis has weathered 
previous crisis such as the 1987 stock market crash.34 Moreover, some studies demonstrated 
that investors are paying more attention to the internal regulations of companies, indicating the 
effectiveness of the capital market hypothesis.35 This controversial debate is still ongoing and 
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 See E. Fama, “Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work’ (1970) 25 Journal of 
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divides economists. As Lo observes, even after several decades of research and study, the 
question whether markets are efficient has not yet been solved and there is still no consensus 
among the economists.36 
If we assume that the capital market is efficient and the hypothesis of semi-strong efficient is 
correct, we must acknowledge that information publicly available to the market should also be 
accurate. Three types of information have been categorized by Kershaw.37 The first category 
concerns the company’s financial position and includes financial statements; the second is the 
regulations or legal rules set out in the corporate statute or constitution. The last category 
encompasses any information about managerial misbehaviour or incompetence. These 
categories of information must be made accessible to the public to properly reflect a company’s 
shares price. However, given the widespread financial fraud occurring in today’s China, the 
price of shares does not actually reflect the value of a company.38 In addition, it is generally 
believed that the Chinese capital market is a policy market rather than a real capital market. 
This so-called policy market has two implications: first, the market is extremely vulnerable to 
variation in the government’s policy; secondly, policies regulating the capital market are 
changeable.39 This capital market, which is so characteristic of the market in China, is relevant 
to the background of the economic reforms started in 1978. The ‘cross the river by feeling its 
stones’ paradigm was promoted by Deng Xiaoping, the former leader of China, in order to 
implement the reform policy and break down resistance to it.40 This paradigm had a positive 
influence on almost every aspect of China – a state with little experience and knowledge of 
market economics at that time. However, the paradigm has now become an obstacle for the 
development of the capital market as the price of shares does not mirror the value of a company 
owing to unpredictable policies.41 Wang and Ye have also concluded that the ‘cross the river 
by feeling its stones’ paradigm unquestionably leads to the policy market, which incurs the 
ineffectiveness of the capital market.42  
In light of the above discussion, the capital market could to some extent effectively constrain 
managerial misbehaviour in general. However, it is strongly doubted that it could reduce 
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 A. Lo, “Efficient Markets Hypothesis,” in The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics,Ed. L. Blume and S. 
Durlauf, (2edn, palgrave Mcmillan, 2007). 
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agency cost in the context of modern China owing to the prevalence of financial fault and the 
uncertain policy market.  
3.4 The Market for Corporate Control 
The market for corporate control has been regarded as a central mechanism for constraining the 
misbehaviour of managers and directors since it was first unveiled by Henry Manne.43 The 
basic idea behind this theory is that self-dealing or inefficient management may induce a low 
company share price, resulting in a corporate takeover threat. If a company is successfully 
acquired, those self-serving managers may be removed. In light of the risk of being sacked, 
managers have to try their best to increase company profit and act in the best interests of the 
company as a whole rather than pursuing their own interests to the detriment of the company. 
In this sense, the market for corporate control could reduce agency cost and constrain 
managerial misbehaviour.44 However, this theory is based on the assumption that the market is 
efficient or at least relatively efficient: incompetence or the abuse of managerial discretion for 
self-benefit would be reflected in the capital market by lowering the value and share price of 
the company. Accordingly, an acquirer can seize this opportunity to acquire the company and 
remove bad managers. 
However, several factors need to be considered to assess how this mechanism operates in 
practice. First, it should be noted that takeovers are not easy to execute. Indeed, they are a very 
expensive way of changing the management of a company as they involve substantial 
transactions costs.45 Accordingly, a prudent bidder must consider the current value of a 
company and the agency costs incurred by its managers as well as the costs of acquiring the 
company before making a takeover decision. Generally, only when there is a profit-making 
opportunity in the value delta,46 will a bidder offer to buy controlling company shares. 
Nevertheless, as Kershaw points out, agency costs alone are not normally large enough to 
activate a bid.47 Even if they cause a significant reduction in a company’s shares, Coffee 
considers that internal corporate governance mechanisms would be instigated before a bidder 
arrives on the scene.48 Moreover, the evidence that corporate governance could be improved or 
agency costs reduced after takeovers remains ambiguous. Singh and Weisse have found that the 
main motivation behind corporate takeover is not to improve an acquired company’s 
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competence but to build the business empire.49 Also, the empirical evidence in the UK has 
shown that takeover markets are not notably related to poor performance.50 Furthermore, 
Kouloridas argues that the threat posed by the market of corporate control could fuel 
managerial incentives for self-interested acquisitions.51 Some managers may not wait to 
become targets if they know they will be ousted following a takeover. Consequently, they may 
attempt a defensive takeover to protect their own personal interests as the threat of replacing 
them is enough to make them act in their own interests. In this sense, the market for corporate 
control may increase agency cost and harm the interests of the minority shareholders. 
When it comes to China, the effectiveness of the market for corporate control faces greater 
challenges. Empirical research conducted by Zhang has found that the extent to which transfer 
of corporate control improves a company’s performance depends on the status of ownership 
concentration and its variation during the process of transformation.52 Here, the function of the 
market for corporate control in China is obviously not useful. Indeed, several factors contribute 
to this: first, the ongoing reform of share trading has not proved unproblematic. This reform 
seeks is to change split shareholding structures into one single form that could be freely 
transferred to the general public in order to implement the principle that the same shareholding 
should have the same right. It was expected that most non-tradable shares owned by central or 
local governments in listed companies would be reduced to an acceptable level and the modern 
corporate governance of SOEs could be established. However, the basic ownership structure of 
companies remains unchanged even after several years’ reform, 53  and State investment 
companies are still the block holders of those listed companies. This makes it more difficult for 
the market for corporate control to function. Secondly, the visible hand of government prevails 
almost everywhere in the market despite the demise of the planned-economy. It is fair to say 
that the history of the market for corporate control is the history of government intervention, as 
the government remains continuously concerned with enterprise ownership partly because the 
traditional concept that the Communist state should control companies and markets has not 
completely vanished. In light of government intervention, accurate prediction of whether a 
takeover would be successful is extremely difficult because decision making power is in the 
hands of the government. Therefore, the market for corporate control’s disciplinary function in 
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deterring bad managers is weakened. Thirdly, the incomplete legal system of mergers and 
takeovers in China also casts doubts over the efficiency of the market for corporate control. 
Although several laws and regulations have been published to regulate mergers and takeovers, 
including the Measures for the Administration of the Takeover of Listed Companies Law and 
the Administration of Disclosure of Information on the Change of Shareholdings in Listed 
Companies, many problems persist because of imperfections in these regulations and an 
absence of other relevant laws. For instance, some of the regulations which were drafted under 
reforms concerning split shareholding structures are not suitable for addressing problems in 
capital markets after the reform of share-trading while the corresponding laws and regulations 
are still deficient. Fourth, it is also argued that the history of capital and stock markets in China 
is far too short, which inevitably creates some problems. Only in 1990, were two national stock 
exchanges authorised to be established: the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 1990 and the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 1991. It is widely recognised that China’s economic miracle 
could not have been achieved without the establishment of these stock markets, though many 
problems have emerged over the last twenty years. One of these problems is the extremely 
strict regulation of Initial Public Offerings (IPO).54 This means that the motives for acquiring a 
company do not necessarily include improvement of its performance in corporate governance 
but can sometimes be merely to obtain listed status. These numerous limitations in China would 
undoubtedly weaken the effectiveness of the market for corporate control. 
4. CONCLUSION 
Unlike other countries which have either vertical or horizontal agency cost problems, China has 
both. This is the result of China’s SOE reform and its concentrated ownership structure. In 
order to reduce these agency costs, legal and non-legal mechanisms must be put in place to 
constrain the opportunistic behaviour of managers and controlling shareholders. While much 
literature has focused on legal mechanisms owing to the law’s key role in this respect, the 
effectiveness of non-legal mechanisms in reducing agency cost should not be neglected. Four 
market forces have been identified and discussed in this article. Although these market forces 
may be effective in some other countries, their functions are hampered in the context of modern 
China owing to the aforementioned reasons discussed above. However, this does not mean that 
market forces are not indispensable in protecting the interests of minority shareholders. Rather, 
it represents the necessity for reforming and improving these non-legal mechanisms so as to 
provide better protections for minority shareholders in China. 
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